CHARACTERISTICS OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND PERFORMANCE OF GEM LISTED COMPANIES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF VENTURE CAPITAL PARTICIPATION by Yang, Yuan et al.
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2019), pp. 287 - 310
p-ISSN: 1410 8046, e-ISSN: 2460 9196
CHARACTERISTICS OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND 
PERFORMANCE OF GEM-LISTED COMPANIES FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF VENTURE CAPITAL PARTICIPATION
Yuan Yang*, Yi Pan*a, Bingkun Yang*, Wenli Huang**
* China Academy of Financial Research, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou, 
China.
* China Academy of Financial Research, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou, 
China. Email: wlhuangmath@126.com
a Corresponding Author. Email: 18368386103@163.com
This paper uses a difference-in-difference model to study the impact of venture capital 
(VC) participation on board characteristics. Our sample includes companies listed on 
the growth enterprise market (GEM) on China’s Shenzhen stock exchange over the 
period 2009 to 2014. Our measure of board characteristics is chief executive officer 
(CEO) duality, the scale of the board of directors, and the proportion of independent 
directors. Our empirical analysis reveals the following findings: the VC-backed GEM-
listed companies are more inclined to choose the mode of CEO duality and contain 
a large board of directors and a high proportion of independent directors. These 
characteristics, we find, are conducive to improving company performance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Venture Capital (VC) originated in the United States in the 1930s and has prevailed 
since the 1970s. It was not until the 1980s that China’s VC industry began to 
develop. In 1985, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
approved for the first time the supporting role of VC for high-tech enterprises 
in the public document “Decision on the Reform of Science and Technology 
System.” The China New Technology Venture Capital Company was established 
in September of the same year, marking the official introduction of VC to China. In 
the first year after the launch of the Shenzhen Small and Medium-sized Enterprise 
Stock Market in 2004, seven companies supported by VC were successfully listed. 
In November 2008, the first government entrepreneurship guidance fund was 
officially launched. With the deepening of reform and opening up, many foreign 
VC institutions have entered the Chinese market.
Most VC institutions invest in high-tech enterprises, which often face problems 
such as a shortage of development funds at the early stage and are characterized 
by high risk and large investments. In 2009, the establishment of China’s Growth 
Enterprise Market (GEM) pushed the development of high-tech industry to 
new heights, also creating a good environment for the growth of VC in China. 
Because high-tech enterprises have hidden risks in all aspects of development, 
traditional financial institutions such as banks are reluctant to provide them loans. 
In contrast, VC institutions are attracted by the high level of innovation and high-
yield characteristics of startup enterprises and are therefore more likely to help 
these enterprises by becoming their partners and through other means. Although 
VC provides financial support for startups, it also injects new vitality and provides 
value-added services.
The rapid development of VC has caught the eye of scholars at home and 
abroad. The relation between VC and their invested companies has thus become 
a research hotspot. Foreign research on the relation between VC and corporate 
governance is relatively mature (Suchard, 2009), but the findings might not apply 
to China. Current research in China, however, has the following shortcomings. 
First, the research mainly focuses on the impact of VC participation on company 
performance and Initial Public Offering (IPO) underpricing, with most of the 
research addressing the corporate governance role of VC. Second, most of the 
research used cross-sectional data at the time of the company’s IPO and did not 
compare the data between the periods before and after the exit of VC. Third, 
hardly any research has been conducted on the impact of VC participation on the 
characteristics of listed companies’ board of directors.
Since its establishment in 2009, China’s GEM has faced problems such as a 
high price-to-earnings ratio and imperfect information disclosure. Most of its 
listed companies are startups with high business risks. In these companies, the 
board of directors is important not only in terms of corporate governance, but also 
in terms of the company’s performance and other aspects. Based on the analysis 
above, this paper studies how VC influences company performance by affecting 
the characteristics of the company’s board. Specifically, this paper uses GEM-
listed companies as the research object and annual data at the time of their IPOs 
(t, before VC institutions exit) and two to three years after the IPOs (t + 2 and t + 
3, after VC institutions exit). First it compares the impact of VC institutions on the 
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characteristics of the company’s board of directors before and after exit, and then 
it explores in depth the impact of board characteristics on company performance.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
A. VC and Board Characteristics
A1. Board Size
The board of directors is the permanent body responsible for implementing the 
resolutions of shareholder meetings, and it is composed of directors elected by the 
shareholders. Board directors have the power to appoint and dismiss managers. 
Zahra and Pearce (1991) found that, in a startup, the larger the board of directors, the 
more effectively it can control the executives, and the interests of shareholders can 
be maintained. Generally, company management will find it difficult to compete 
with a large board of directors. As the size of the board increases, its authority to 
supervise managers’ behavior will grow, and resolutions that are not conducive 
to shareholders’ interests will be difficult to have approved by the board. A larger 
board is often able to attract more capable board members, with richer knowledge, 
bringing the board more resources and opportunities. For example, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) found that the professional management knowledge of a large board 
can promote the director performance. Because major decisions in a company are 
usually decided by voting, the larger the board of directors, the more effective the 
suppression of insider control.
Many scholars have found that VC institutions have an impact on the size and 
structure of corporate boards (Zhang and Liao, 2011; Zhao and Wen, 2015). After 
investing in a startup, VC institutions usually send professionals to the company 
to participate in its business management. These professionals are likely to enter 
the board of directors of the invested company, thereby gaining more voting rights 
while expanding the board’s size. Accordingly, we predict that VC institutions will 
protect their own interests by encouraging the invested companies to establish a 
larger board of directors to limit the rights of corporate insiders. We thus propose 
the following hypothesis.
H1: VC participation will increase the size of the board of GEM-listed 
companies.
A2. CEO Duality
According to the theory of fiduciary responsibility, the management of a company 
is the fiduciary responsible for the company’s assets. It intends to provide qualified 
managers and will not deliberately damage the company’s interests. Therefore, 
CEO duality can provide the company better business management. From the 
perspective of the company’s long-term development, if its managers and owners 
are not the same people, this can reduce business efficiency or create competition 
between the board chairperson and the general manager.
In environmental dependence theory, which synthesizes environmental 
factors, environmental changes have an important impact on a company’s board 
structure. If the environment in which the listed company grows changes greatly 
and is full of uncertainty, the company’s CEO duality structure will improve 
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decision making efficiency, and its benefits will be greater than the agency costs. 
If, however, the company’s environment is stable, given the agency problem, 
the separation of ownership and management could benefit the company’s 
development.
In modern management theory, the structure of CEO duality can reduce agency 
costs, whereas the separation of board of directors and general manager can cause 
conflicts of interest between the board and the general manager, reducing the 
efficiency of the company and increasing agency costs. Based on principal–agent 
theory, people are rational, self-interested opportunists. Every individual will 
chase after greater benefits, which can result in adverse selection and moral risk. 
Therefore, CEO duality could provide an opportunity for the manager who is also 
a board member to damage the interests of shareholders.
Because of the imperfect mechanisms of China’s relatively young GEM, the 
environment of high-tech listed enterprises is rapidly changing. Accordingly, 
we assume that the structure of CEO duality can improve decision making and 
operational efficiency, enhance the innovation autonomy of enterprises, and 
reduce VC institutions’ investment risks by providing a more comprehensive 
understanding of enterprises. This paper thus proposes the following hypothesis.
H2: VC-backed GEM-listed companies are more inclined to choose the CEO 
duality structure.
A3. Proportion of Independent Directors
The proportion of independent directors, calculated by the ratio of the number of 
independent directors of the company to the total number of board members, is a 
measurement of the independence of the board of directors. Independent directors 
are employed externally, independent of shareholders and managers. Their main 
role is to supervise the company’s executives and prevent them from harming its 
interests. Generally, independent directors are professionals in different industries, 
so that they can properly monitor management’s operations and provide good 
advice with their professional knowledge. Many scholars believe that VC-backed 
companies have a more independent board structure (Baker and Gompers, 2003; 
Suchard, 2009). After investing in a company, VC institutions often send experts 
to the company to provide professional consulting services to reduce the risk of 
principal–agent problems caused by information asymmetry. VC institutions 
also have incentives to seek more professional independent directors for the 
invested enterprises. This paper thus speculates that VC participation increases 
the proportion of independent directors on the boards of GEM-listed companies. 
We therefore propose the following hypothesis.
H3: VC participation increases the proportion of independent directors on the 
boards of GEM-listed companies.
B. Board Characteristics and Company Performance
B1. Board Size
The research on the impact of board size on company performance has produced 
mixed conclusions: some find that the board’s size is positively correlated with 
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company performance (Geoffrey and Gavin, 2003; Li, 2015), whereas others find 
that it is negatively correlated with company performance (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Wang, 2012). For who support the first conclusion, the larger the board of 
directors, the greater the control and the richer the resources, all of which are 
conducive to improving company performance; for those who support the second 
conclusion, a larger board will lead to more serious agency problems and increase 
agency costs and thus reduce company performance. This paper argues that, for 
the GEM companies, the impact of board size on firm performance is uncertain. 
We therefore propose the following two hypotheses.
H4a: The larger the board of directors, the better the company’s performance.
H4b: The larger the board of directors, the worse the company’s performance.
B2. CEO Duality
There are also two different opinions about the impact of CEO duality on company 
performance. Some believe that CEO duality is conducive to improving company 
performance (Manigart, 2002; Han, 2015), because this structure reduces the cost 
of communications between the board chairperson and the general manager, and 
thus reduces information asymmetry, which can improve company performance. 
Others find that CEO duality will not benefit company performance (Liu and 
Chang, 2009), because the chairperson will lose independence under such 
structure, and the chairperson could hurt the company’s interests. This paper 
therefore proposes the following hypotheses.
H5a: The CEO duality structure helps improve company performance.
H5b: The CEO duality structure does not improve company performance.
B3. Proportion of Independent Directors
Most of the research finds a positive correlation between the proportion of 
independent directors and company performance (Liu, 2011; Xie, 2011; Zhang, 
2012). The minority who find the opposite find that independent directors could 
fail to play their role and thus do not improve company performance. To explore 
which conclusion holds among China’s GEM companies, this paper proposes the 
following hypotheses.
H6a: The proportion of independent directors on the board is positively 
correlated with company performance.
H6b: The proportion of independent directors on the board is negatively 
correlated with company performance.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
A. Samples and Data
This paper selects companies that were listed on China’s GEM from October 30, 
2009, when the GEM was officially launched, to December 31, 2014 (to cover three 
years after IPOs). Because of the suspension of the GEM in 2013, there are no data 
for that year. To ensure the objectiveness of our results, we refer to the “Guidelines 
for the Classification of Listed Companies” promulgated by the China Securities 
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Regulatory Commission for industry standards. Our samples were processed as 
follows: we excluded 1) all ST companies and companies with incomplete data 
and 2) companies with abnormal data. The financial data and data on board 
characteristics are from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research database1 
and the Wind database.2 Wu’s (2012) method is used to determine VC participation.
The final sample comprises 388 companies listed on the GEM, with 1,164 
observations, covering annual data in the IPO year (t) and two and three years after 
the IPO (t + 2, t + 3). Among these companies, 221 (59.95%) have VC participation, 
and 167 (43.04%) have no VC participation.
B. Variable Definition
B1. VC and Board Characteristics
(1) Explained Variables. The structure of CEO duality is represented by the dummy 
variable dual. When a company chooses the CEO duality structure, dual equals 
one, and zero otherwise. The size of the board of directors (bsize) refers to the 
number of board members, and the proportion of independent directors (outdire) 
refers to the ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of 
board directors of the company.
(2) Explanatory Variables. The explanatory variables of this paper are the 
dummy variable vc*exit_before and the characteristic variables of the VC institution. 
The variable vc*exit_before is determined by the presence (VC = 1) or absence (VC 
= 0) of VC participation, and whether the VC exits (if it does, exit_before = 0, and 
otherwise exit_before = 1). If vc*exit_before equals one, this means that the VC 
institution has not withdrawn from the invested company; that is, there is VC 
participation; when vc*exit_before equals zero, the VC institution has exited.
(3) Control Variables. This paper uses the company’s growth, financial leverage, 
size, and performance as control variables. The variable for company growth 
(Growth) is measured by Tobin’s Q, financial leverage (Lev) is measured by the 
asset-to-liability ratio, company size (Size) is measured as the natural logarithm of 
the company’s total assets, and company performance (ROE) is measured by the 
company’s return on equity. To control for industry and year effects, respectively, 
the industry dummy variable (IND) and the year dummy variable (YR) are also 
added to the model.
B2. Board Characteristics and Company Performance
(1) Explained Variables. This paper uses the return on equity (ROE) to represent 
the performance of GEM-companies.
(2) Explanatory Variables. We include as explanatory variables the dummy 
variable for CEO duality (dual), board size (bsize), and the independent director 
ratio (outdire).
(3) Control Variables. We include as control variables company growth (growth), 
financial leverage (lev), company size (size), an industry dummy variable 
(IND), and a year dummy variable (YR).
1  See http://us.gtadata.com/.
2  See https://www.wind.com.cn/.
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C. Model Design
C1. VC and Board Characteristics
This paper uses a difference-in-differences (DID) model to analyze the impact 
of VC on the characteristics of the board of directors. We categorize companies 
with VC participation as the experimental group, and companies without VC 
participation as the control group. The basic form of the traditional DID model is;
where vc indicates whether it is in the experimental group, and exit_before indicates 
whether the VC exits.
The traditional model is only applicable in the case in which, for each company 
i, the VC institutions exit at the same time. However, obviously, VC might not 
exit at the same time point. Some companies that belong to the control group in 
period t will be in the experimental group in period t + 1. To resolve this issue, this 
paper uses the continuous time DID model. According to H1 to H3, the model is 
as follows.
where exit_before is a dummy variable that measures whether the VC exits, where 
exit_before = 1 indicates observations of a VC-backed company before the VC exits 
and exit_before = 0 indicates observations after the VC exits. The term vc*exit_
before is the cross-term between vc and exit_before, where a value of one indicates 
observations before the VC exits, and a value of zero indicates observations with 
no VC participation or after the VC institution exits. The terms IND and YR are 
industry and year fixed effects, respectively.
C2. Board Characteristics and Company Performance
According to H4 to H6, the following model is proposed:
(2)
(3)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(1)
(4)
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where company performance (ROE) is the explanatory variable, the board 
characteristics (dual, bsize, outdire) are explanatory variables, and the company 
characteristics are control variables.
D. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 lists the names and definitions of variables used in this paper. Table 2 
shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables of all the samples. There are 
1,164 observations, with 388 GEM-listed companies’ annual data for periods t, 
t + 2, and t + 3 from 2009 to 2014. The average size of the board of directors for 
all the observations is about eight people, and the average ratio of independent 
directors is 0.3784.
Table 1.
Variable Definition
In this table, all variables appearing in this paper are defined and explained.
Description Variable Variable Name Definition
Panel A: VC and Board Characteristics
Explained 
Variables
CEO Duality dual dummy variable, dual = 1 if the company 
chooses the CEO duality structure, 
otherwise dual = 0
Board Size bsize the number of board members
Proportion of 
Independent 
Directors
outdire the number of independent directors / 
the total number of board directors of a 
company
Explanatory 
Variables
Cross-term vc*exit_before dummy variable, determined by 
whether there is VC participation and 
whether the VC exit, vc*exit_before = 1 if 
the VC institution has not exited from 
the VC-backed company; otherwise 
vc*exit_before = 0
Control 
Variables
Company’s 
Growth
growth Tobin Q value
Financial 
Leverage
lev asset-liability ratio = total assets / total 
liabilities
Company 
Performance
ROE net profit of the year / total equity at the 
end of the year
Company Size size the natural logarithm of the company’s 
total assets
Year Dummy 
Variable
YR dummy variable, controlling the year 
effect, set according to the years of 
different companies’ IPO
Industry 
Dummy 
Variable
IND dummy variable, controlling the industry 
effect, set according to the industry code 
of the “Industry Classification Guide 
for Listed Companies” published by the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, a total of 13 
codes are used in this paper
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Table 2. 
Descriptive Statistics of All Samples
Table 1.
Variable Definition (Continued)
This table has descriptive statistics of the data for the entire sample. Each variable noted in column 1 is explained in 
Table 1.
Description Variable Variable Name Definition
Panel B: Board Characteristics and Company Performance
Explained 
Variables
Company 
Performance
ROE net profit of the year / total equity at the 
end of the year
Explanatory 
Variables
CEO Duality dual dummy variable, dual = 1 if the company 
chooses the CEO duality structure, 
otherwise dual = 0
Board Size bsize the number of board members
Proportion of 
Independent 
Directors
outdire the number of independent directors / 
the total number of board directors of a 
company
Control 
Variables
Company’s 
Growth
growth Tobin Q value
Financial 
Leverage
lev asset-liability ratio = total assets / total 
liabilities
Company Size size the natural logarithm of the company’s 
total assets
Year Dummy 
Variable
YR dummy variable, controlling the year 
effect, set according to the years of 
different companies’ IPO
Industry 
Dummy 
Variable
IND dummy variable, controlling the industry 
effect, set according to the industry code 
of the “Industry Classification Guide 
for Listed Companies” published by the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, a total of 13 
codes are used in this paper
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dual 1164 0.4898 0.5001 0.0000 1.0000
Bsize 1164 8.1946 1.3604 4.0000 14.0000
Outdire 1164 0.3784 0.0588 0.1818 0.8333
ROE 1164 0.0999 0.0530 -0.0901 0.3423
Lev 1164 0.2054 0.1377 0.0110 0.7695
Size 1164 20.7065 0.5486 19.4910 23.8933
Growth 1164 4.7549 3.4363 1.0876 29.5610
Tables 3 and 4 show the descriptive statistics of the samples with and without 
VC participation, respectively. In Table 3, the average board size of enterprises 
with VC participation is 8.3251 members, with an average ratio of independent 
directors of 0.3890, whereas the figures for companies without VC participation 
(Table 4) are 7.99 members and 0.3748, respectively. Comparing Tables 3 and 4, 
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we find that, in companies with VC participation, the board size is larger, and the 
proportion of independent directors is higher.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. VC and Board Characteristics
A1. Experimental and Control Groups in the Absence of VC Participation
When choosing an investment target, VC institutions prefer companies with a 
better governance structure and higher performance. Therefore, endogenous 
problems can arise during the research process, such as VC-backed and non–VC-
backed companies having systematic differences before VC participation. Because 
the data on board characteristics before listing cannot be obtained, this paper uses 
the period two and three years after the IPO to represent the exit time of VC, to 
explore the board characteristics of VC-backed companies after VC exits. By doing 
so, we can rule out potential differences in board characteristics between non–
VC-backed companies and VC-backed companies after VC exits. The regression 
results in Tables 5 to 7 show that, in a stepwise regression process, the coefficients 
of vc are small and nonsignificant, indicating little difference between the two 
groups of companies.
Table 3. 
Descriptive Statistics of Samples of VC-backed Companies
This table has descriptive statistics of the data for the sample of VC-backed companies. Each variable noted in column 
1 is explained in Table 1.
This table has descriptive statistics of the data for the sample of non-VC-backed companies. Each variable noted in 
column 1 is explained in Table 1.
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dual 663 0.5169 0.5001 0.0000 1.0000
Bsize 663 8.3251 1.3278 4.0000 14.0000
Outdire 663 0.3890 0.0827 0.0000 0.8333
ROE 663 0.0971 0.0531 -0.0901 0.3423
Lev 663 0.2170 0.1430 0.0158 0.7695
Size 663 20.7617 0.5333 19.4910 22.5661
Growth 663 4.9940 3.7460 1.0876 29.5610
Table 4. 
Descriptive Statistics of Samples of Non-VC-backed Companies
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dual 501 0.4488 0.4980 0.0000 1.0000
Bsize 501 7.9977 1.3867 4.0000 12.0000
Outdire 501 0.3748 0.0653 0.1818 0.6000
ROE 501 0.1042 0.0525 -0.0735 0.3060
Lev 501 0.1879 0.1879 0.0110 0.6951
Size 501 20.6228 0.5615 19.5314 23.8933
Growth 501 4.3924 2.8707 1.3354 18.4001
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This table reports results of CEO duality and VC exists. The statistics in () is the t-statistic. Column (1) shows the 
regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain additional control 
variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated with *, **, ***, 
respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Table 5.
CEO duality after VC Exits
Variables Dual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vc 0.0395 0.0395 0.0707 0.0673 0.0664
(0.0913) (0.0913) (0.0931) (0.0933) (0.0933)
Lev -0.00611 0.234 0.282 0.306
(0.289) (0.321) (0.323) (0.326)
Size -0.142** -0.143** -0.143**
(0.0815) (0.0816) (0.0817)
Growth 0.0269** 0.0286**
(0.0143) (0.0146)
ROE 0.0505
(0.0960)
Constant -0.173** -0.172* 2.730 2.636 2.622
(0.0690) (0.102) (1.671) (1.675) (1.676)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 775 775 775 775 775
Sample Size 388 388 388 388 388
Table 6.
Board Size after VC Exits
This table reports results of board size and VC exists. The statistics in () is the t-statistic. Column (1) shows the 
regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain additional control 
variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated with *, **, ***, 
respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables Bsize
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vc 0.149 0.101 0.0978 0.0929 0.0752
(0.128) (0.128) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127)
Size 0.219*** 0.247*** 0.255*** 0.326***
(0.0778) (0.0786) (0.0788) (0.0858)
Growth -0.0254** -0.0231* -0.0246**
(0.0117) (0.0119) (0.0119)
ROE 0.0678 0.0491
(0.0517) (0.0521)
Lev -0.749**
(0.355)
Constant 8.047*** 3.468** 2.982* 2.802* 1.503
(0.0973) (1.630) (1.640) (1.645) (1.755)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 776 776 776 776 776
Sample Size 388 388 388 388 388
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Table 7.
Proportion of Independent Directors after VC Exits
This table reports results of proportion of independent directors after VC exists. The statistics in () is the t-statistic. 
Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain 
additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated 
with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables
Outdire
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vc 0.0026 0.0041 0.0050 0.0052 0.0051
(0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058)
Size -0.0062* -0.00970** -0.0098** -0.0102**
(0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0041)
Lev 0.0343** 0.0315* 0.0321*
(0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0167)
ROE -0.0031 -0.0028
(0.0026) (0.0026)
Growth 0.0004
(0.0005)
Constant 0.375*** 0.504*** 0.568*** 0.572*** 0.578***
(0.0043) (0.0785) (0.0841) (0.0842) (0.0847)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 776 776 776 776 776
Sample Size 388 388 388 388 388
A2. Randomness of VCs Choosing Target Companies
This paper uses probit regression in a binary selection model to determine the 
relation between VC screening factors and board characteristics. The regression 
results are shown in Tables 8 to 10. The coefficient of board characteristics is 
not significant, indicating no obvious influence of board characteristics on VCs’ 
selection of target companies.
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Table 8. 
Relationship between VC’s Screening Factors and CEO Duality
This table reports results of the relation between VC’s screening factors and CEO duality. The statistics in () is the 
t-statistic. Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(5) show the results that 
contain additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is 
indicated with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables
Vc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dual 0.0395 0.0616 0.0680 0.0673 0.0670
(0.0912) (0.0921) (0.0924) (0.0924) (0.0924)
Size 0.359*** 0.456*** 0.456*** 0.455***
(0.0747) (0.0833) (0.0834) (0.0834)
Lev -0.888*** -0.879*** -0.859***
(0.326) (0.327) (0.331)
Growth 0.00481 0.00615
(0.0146) (0.0149)
ROE 0.0413
(0.0982)
Constant 0.157*** -7.398*** -9.206*** -9.228*** -9.238***
(0.0604) (1.574) (1.720) (1.722) (1.722)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 755 755 775 775 775
Table 9.
Relationship between VC’s Screening Factors and Board Size
This table reports results of the relation between VC’s screening factors and board size. The statistics in () is the 
t-statistic. Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(5) show the results that 
contain additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is 
indicated with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables
Vc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bsize 0.0475 0.0199 0.0151 0.0165 0.0161
(0.0349) (0.0357) (0.0358) (0.0360) (0.0360)
Size 0.353*** 0.450*** 0.449*** 0.449***
(0.0755) (0.0842) (0.0842) (0.0842)
Lev -0.874*** -0.864*** -0.845**
(0.326) (0.328) (0.331)
Growth 0.00556 0.00682
(0.0146) (0.0149)
ROE 0.0398
(0.0982)
Constant -0.208 -7.409*** -9.180*** -9.208*** -9.218***
(0.285) (1.566) (1.710) (1.713) (1.713)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 776 776 776 776 776
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Table 10.
Relationship between VC’s Screening Factors and Proportion of 
Independent Directors
This table reports results of the relation between VC’s screening factors and proportion of independent directors. The 
statistics in () is the t-statistic. Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(5) 
show the results that contain additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables
VC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outdire 0.203 0.215 0.191 0.193 0.193
(0.742) (0.746) (0.750) (0.750) (0.750)
Size 0.361*** 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.456*** 0.456***
(0.0745) (0.0830) (0.0831) (0.0831) (0.0831)
Lev -0.881*** -0.873*** -0.853*** -0.853***
(0.326) (0.327) (0.330) (0.330)
Growth 0.00447 0.00579 0.00579
(0.0146) (0.0149) (0.0149)
ROE 0.0412 0.0412
(0.0983) (0.0983)
Constant -7.483*** -9.276*** -9.344*** -9.299*** -9.299***
(1.599) (1.742) (1.742) (1.743) (1.743)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 776 776 776 776 776
A3. VC and Board Characteristics
Table 11 shows the empirical results of Model 1. It can be seen that the coefficient 
of vc*exit_before is always positive at the 1% level of significance, even after all 
the control variables are added, indicating that, compared with non–VC-backed 
companies, VC-backed companies are more inclined to choose the mode of CEO 
duality, and verifying H1. The possible reasons for choosing CEO duality are 
as follows: CEO duality can reduce information asymmetry between company 
owners and managers, improve the efficiency of decision making, and help 
optimize the corporate governance structure.
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Table 12 illustrates the empirical results of Model 2, where the coefficient of 
vc*exit_before is also significantly positive. The results verify H2, that is, companies 
with VC participation have a larger board of directors. This could be due to the fact 
that VC institutions always send professionals to the invested company’s board of 
directors to participate in the company’s operations and management.
Table 11.
The Impact of VC on Board Characteristics (Model 1, CEO Duality)
This table reports results of the impact of VC on board characteristics (CEO duality). The statistics in () is the t-statistic. 
Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain 
additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated 
with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables
Dual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vc*exit_before
0.751***
(2.95)
0.778***
(3.01)
1.495***
(2.70)
1.175***
(3.21)
1.152***
(3.13)
Growth -0.113*
(-1.66)
-0.151** 
(-2.15)
-0.150** 
(-2.10)
-0.161** 
(-2.20)
Size
1.103**
(2.46)
1.364***
(2.78)
1.370***
(2.77)
Lev -3.381*
(-1.80)
-3.538*
(-1.88)
ROE
-0.208
(-0.73)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Table 12.
The Impact of VC on Board Characteristics (Model 2, Board Size)
This table reports results of the impact of VC on board characteristics (board size). The statistics in () is the t-statistic. 
Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(5) show the results that contain 
additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated 
with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables
bsize
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vc*exit_before
0.207***#
(4.12)
0.206***
(4.20)
0.214***
(5.02)
0.213***
(4.94)
0.203***
(4.76)
Growth 0.0153(0.47)
0.0132
(0.41)
0.0124
(0.40)
0.0126
(0.41)
Size
0.317***
(4.72)
0.403***
(5.93)
0.406***
(5.88)
Lev -0.701*** 
(-3.73)
-0.711*** 
(-3.76)
ROE
-0.0587*
(-2.10)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
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Table 13 shows the empirical results of Model 3. The coefficient of vc*exit_before 
is significantly positive at the 5% level, indicating that VC participation is always 
accompanied by a higher proportion of independent directors on the invested 
company’s board, and verifying H3. The previous analysis (in Section II A3) has 
shown that independent directors supervise corporate executives to prevent them 
from harming the company’s interests. After VC invests in the company, to reduce 
the risk of principal–agent problems caused by information asymmetry, experts 
are often assigned to provide professional advice, and there is also incentive 
to seek more capable independent directors, thus increasing the proportion of 
independent directors of the company.
Table 13.
The Impact of VC on Board Characteristics 
(Model 3, Proportion of Independent Directors)
This table reports results of the impact of VC on board characteristics (proportion of independent directors). The 
statistics in () is the t-statistic. Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(5) 
show the results that contain additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables
outdire
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vc*exit_before
0.0031**
(2.65)
0.0031**
(2.75)
0.0030**
(2.34)
0.0030**
(2.66)
0.0034**
(2.92)
Growth -0.0011** 
(-2.92)
-0.0010** 
(-2.81)
-0.0010*** 
(-3.74)
-0.0010*** 
(-3.75)
Size
-0.0076*** 
(-4.04)
-0.0133*** 
(-5.47)
-0.0135*** 
(-5.51)
Lev 0.0469*** (4.35)
0.0473*** 
(4.38)
ROE
0.0023
(0.80)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
B. Board Characteristics and Company Performance
Table 14 shows the regression results for company performance and the CEO 
duality structure. The coefficient of dual is significantly positive at the 1% level, 
indicating that CEO duality is beneficial to company performance, supporting 
H5a.
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Table 14.
Relationship between Company Performance and CEO Duality
This table reports results of relation between company performance and CEO duality. The statistics in () is the 
t-statistic. Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(5) show the results that 
contain additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is 
indicated with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables
ROE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dual 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.100***
(0.0104) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0098)
Size 0.0384*** 0.0570** 0.0564**
(0.0113) (0.0254) (0.0243)
Lev -0.153 -0.152
(0.111) (0.108)
Growth 0.0012
(0.0024)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled
Constant 0.0652 -0.715** -1.078* -1.073*
(0.0448) (0.262) (0.535) (0.524)
Observations 1,163 1,163 1,163 1,163
Sample Size 388 388 388 388
R-squared 0.651 0.652 0.652 0.652
Table 15 shows the regression results for company performance and board 
size. The variable bsize is also positively correlated with ROE at the 1% level, 
indicating that the larger the board size, the higher the company’s performance, 
and H4a is verified. This paper concludes that a company with a large board of 
directors can have more resources and opportunities, which have a positive effect 
on the company’s performance.
Table 16 shows the regression results for company performance and the 
proportion of independent directors. The coefficient of outdire is positive at the 
1% significance level, indicating that the higher the proportion of independent 
directors, the better the company’s performance. Thus, H6a is verified. Many of 
the company’s independent directors are celebrities or scholars of high prestige 
or professional knowledge in a certain field. Not only can they bring different 
resources to the company, but also they can provide consulting services and thus 
make a positive contribution to the company’s performance.
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Table 15.
Relationship between Company Performance and Board Size
This table reports results of the relationship between company performance and board size. The statistics in () is the 
t-statistic. Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(5) show the results that 
contain additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is 
indicated with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables
ROE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bsize 0.0529*** 0.0522*** 0.0514*** 0.0512***
(0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0101) (0.0105)
Size 0.0220* 0.0362* 0.0358*
(0.0117) (0.0199) (0.0193)
Lev -0.115 -0.115
(0.0937) (0.0916)
Growth 0.0011
(0.0025)
Constant -0.298*** -0.738** -1.011** -1.009**
(0.0950) (0.264) (0.378) (0.374)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled
TR controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 1,164 1,164 1,164 1,164
Sample Size 388 388 388 388
R-squared 0.655 0.655 0.655 0.655
Table 16.
Relation between Company Performance and the Proportion of 
Independent Directors
This table reports results of the relation between company performance and the proportion of independent directors. 
The statistics in () is the t-statistic. Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-
(4) show the results that contain additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables
ROE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outdire  0.729***  0.741***  0.760***  0.774***
(0.173) (0.177) (0.158) (0.146)
Size  0.0457***  0.0709***  0.0691***
 (0.00941)  (0.0197)  (0.0177)
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C. Robustness Tests
C1. Fictional Treatment Group
In the previous analysis, t refers to the year a company goes public, with VC still 
participating in the company’s operations, whereas years t + 2 and t + 3 refer to two 
and three years, respectively, after the IPO, when VC has exited. The empirical 
results above show that VC participation has a significant impact on board 
characteristics. To test the robustness of this conclusion, this paper further sets t + 
2 as the year in which a company still has VC participation, that is, years t and t + 
2 are VC participation years, and year t + 3 is the VC exit year.
The regression results are shown in Tables 17 to 19. When we set years t and 
t + 2 as having VC participation, and year t + 3 as the year VC exits, the coefficient 
of vc*exit_before is no longer significant. This means that the original empirical 
results are stable.
Table 16.
Relation between Company Performance and the Proportion of 
Independent Directors (Continued)
Variables
ROE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lev -0.205* -0.203*
(0.113) (0.107)
Growth  0.00436
 (0.00483)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled
TR controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 1,164 1,164 1,164 1,164
Sample size 388 388 388 388
R-Squared 0.652 0.653 0.654 0.654
Table 17.
VC and CEO Duality (t+2 as the years with VC participation)
This table reports results of the VC and CEO duality (t+2 as the years with VC participation). The statistics in () is the 
t-statistic. Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(4) show the results that 
contain additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is 
indicated with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables
dual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vc*exit_before 0.0283 0.0281 0.0305 0.0310 0.0390
(0.0202) (0.0226) (0.0253) (0.0251) (0.0209)
Growth 0.0153*** 0.0148** 0.0149** 0.0140**
(0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0057)
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Variables
dual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lev 0.260 0.260 0.229**
(0.147) (0.148) (0.0979)
ROE -0.0035 0.0095
(0.0221) (0.0174)
Size -0.104**
(0.0369)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 1,163 1,163 1,163 1,163 1,163
Sample Size 388 388 388 388 388
R-squared 0.046 0.055 0.061 0.061 0.105
Table 18.
VC and Board Size (t+2 as the years with VC participation)
This table reports results of the relation between VC and board size (t+2 as the years with VC participation). The 
statistics in () is the t-statistic. Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(4) 
show the results that contain additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables bsize
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vc*exit_before -0.0348 -0.0308 -0.0317 -0.0165 -0.0155
(0.0428) (0.0484) (0.0451) (0.0470) (0.0470)
Size 0.314*** 0.399*** 0.406*** 0.400***
(0.0686) (0.0754) (0.0772) (0.0690)
Lev -0.703*** -0.720*** -0.709***
(0.184) (0.185) (0.193)
ROE -0.106*** -0.108***
(0.0327) (0.0333)
Growth 0.0134
(0.0308)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 1,163 1,163 1,163 1,163 1,163
Sample Size 388 388 388 388 388
R-squared 0.056 0.067 0.072 0.073 0.074
Table 17.
VC and CEO Duality (t+2 as the years with VC participation) (Continued)
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C2. Regression Results for the Manufacturing Industry
Manufacturing companies account for more than 60% of the entire sample in this 
paper. To further verify the robustness of the previous empirical results, this paper 
uses the DID model to conduct a regression analysis of the manufacturing industry 
subsamples. The regression results shown in Tables 20 to 22 indicate that H1 to 
H3 still hold when only manufacturing companies are considered. The original 
regression results are therefore stable.
Table 19.
VC and Proportion of Independent Directors
(t+2 as the years with VC participation)
This table reports results of the VC and proportion of independent directors (t+2 as the years with VC participation). 
The statistics in () is the t-statistic. Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-
(4) show the results that contain additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables
Outdire
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vc*exit_before -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0005
(0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0029)
Size -0.0082*** -0.0077*** -0.0135*** -0.0136***
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0022)
Growth -0.0010** -0.0010*** -0.0010***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Lev 0.0467*** 0.0470***
(0.0108) (0.0107)
ROE 0.0016
(0.0034)
IND controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 1,164 1,164 1,164 1,164 1,164
Sample Size 388 388 388 388 388
R-squared 0.144 0.146 0.149 0.154 0.154
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Table 20.
VC and CEO Duality (Manufacturing Industry)
This table reports results of the VC and CEO duality relation (manufacturing industry). The statistics in () is the 
t-statistic. Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(4) show the results that 
contain additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is 
indicated with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables Dual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vc*exit_before 1.026* 1.191** 1.754*** 1.874** 1.897**
(0.608) (0.471) (0.626) (0.740) (0.789)
Growth -0.505** -0.626*** -0.597*** -0.598***
(0.222) (0.147) (0.177) (0.173)
Size -1.238** -1.357* -1.400**
(0.568) (0.719) (0.697)
Lev -0.219 -0.252
(2.769) (2.785)
ROE 0.390
(0.772)
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 779 779 779 779 779
Sample Size 260 260 260 260 260
Table 21.
VC and Board Size (Manufacturing Industry)
This table reports results of the VC and board size relation (manufacturing industry). The statistics in () is the t-statistic. 
Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(4) show the results that contain 
additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated 
with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables bsize
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vc*exit_before 0.199** 0.191** 0.201** 0.201** 0.188**
(0.0920) (0.0918) (0.0911) (0.0910) (0.0931)
Growth 0.0444* 0.0538** 0.0512** 0.0518**
(0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0234) (0.0234)
Size 0.416*** 0.459*** 0.465***
(0.0986) (0.108) (0.109)
Lev -0.386 -0.399
(0.400) (0.401)
ROE -0.0684
(0.106)
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 780 780 780 780 780
Sample Size 260 260 260 260 260
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V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS
By using a DID model, multiple linear regression, probit regression, logit 
regression, and other methods, this paper explores the impact of VC participation 
on the board characteristics and performance of GEM-listed companies. We find 
that VC participation has a positive influence on certain board characteristics 
that improve company performance. In our samples, VC-backed GEM-listed 
companies are inclined to choose the CEO duality structure, have a larger board 
of directors and a higher proportion of independent directors, and gain better 
performance as a result.
Based on the analysis above, this paper suggests the following. First, VC 
institutions in China should continuously improve their professional level, enrich 
their social resources, and increase the introduction and training of professional 
talent, thus enhancing the professional level of the entire industry. Moreover, 
government departments should actively guide the development of the VC 
industry, for example, by instituting laws and regulations, and prevent VC 
institutions from harming the development of startups for their own interests. 
Last but not the least, the state should create a sound multilevel capital market to 
broaden the exit channels of VC institutions, allowing VCs to exit more smoothly, 
and encourage VC institutions to invest in more enterprises.
Table 22.
VC and Proportion of Independent Directors (Manufacturing Industry)
This table reports results of the VC and proportion of independent directors relation (manufacturing industry). The 
statistics in () is the t-statistic. Column (1) shows the regression results without control variables, and columns (2)-(4) 
show the results that contain additional control variables than the previous column. Coefficients significant at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated with *, **, ***, respectively. Finally, for variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Variables outdire
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vc*exit_before 0.0135** 0.0131** 0.0134** 0.0134** 0.0117**
(0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0054)
Size -0.0084* -0.0094** -0.0117** -0.0109**
(0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0051)
Growth -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0013
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Lev 0.0235 0.0221
(0.0199) (0.0198)
ROE -0.0089
(0.0062)
YR controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 780 780 780 780 780
Sample Size 261 261 261 261 261
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